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Lynch: Pleading and Practice under the Revised Code
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE REVISED CODE"
LAWRENCE

R.

LYNCH"

In a paper of limited length such as this necessarily must be,
it is impracticable to discuss or even to mention many of the
changes in pleading and practice contained in the Revised Code.
For that reason this discussion will be confined primarily to some
important and interesting changes in Chapter 56, entitled "Pleading and Practice."
At the outset it may be said that the revisers have retained the
common law systera of pleading and procedure.
They declined
to follow in the steps of those jurisdictions which have adopted
what is known as code pleading and practice.
Such changes as
the revisers made were designed to modernize our existing system
and to eliminate some of the technicalities that heretofore have
served no useful purpose except as traps for the unwary.
Venue in County Where Cause of Action Arose.
The first change of importance relates to venue, and is found
in section 2, article 1, chapter 56 of the Revised Code.
Section
2, chapter 123 of Barnes' West Virginia Code 1923, provided that
an action might be brought in any county wherein the cause of
action, or any part thereof, arose, although none of the defendants
resided therein. But venue under that section was limited by § 2
of chapter 124, which provided that process against a defendant
under the first mentioned section should not be directed to the
officer of any other county than that wherein the action was
brought, unless such defendant was a corporation. The result was
that an individual defendant could not be sued in the county
wherein the cause of action arose unless served with process in
such county.
The revisers apparently did not deem it advisable that a jurisdictional statute should be limited and controlled by another
statute governing the direction of process. They therefore eliminated the restriction contained in section 2 of chapter 124, and
amended section 2 of chapter 123, Code 1923 (chapter 56, article
1, section 2), so as to provide that an action, suit or proceeding
may be brought in any county wherein the cause of action, or any
*Address before the Annual Meeting of the West Virginia State Bar
Association at Bluefield, July 29, 1930.
** Member of the Bar of Clarksburg, West Virginia.
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part thereof, arose, although none of the defendants reside therein, in the following instances:
"(a)
When the defendant, or if more than one defendant,
one or more of the defendants, is a corporation;
(b) When the defendant, or if more than one defendant,
one or more of the defendants, are served in such county with
process or notice commencing such action, suit or proceeding.)
The effect of this amendment is to permit an individual defendant to be sued in the county where the cause of action arose,
although not a resident of that county nor served therein, if one
or more of his codefendants is a corporation or is served with
process in such county. As a result of this amendment, the county
where the cause of action arose becomes as important as the county
where one of the defendants resides, when the plaintiff is determining in which county he shall institute his suit.
And as a
matter of principle, it is as fair to compel an individual defendant to defend an action, suit or proceeding in the county where
the cause of action arose as it is to compel him to defend in the
county where one of his codefendants happens to reside.
The
former is the county in which the breach of legal duty occurred,
whether it be ex contractu or ex delicto. It is the county with
reference to which the parties contracted or within whose jurisdictional limits the tort was committed. Therefore, an individual
defendant, although not served in the county in which the cause
of action arose and suit is brought, has even less cause to complain at being compelled to defend in such county upon venue
properly laid, than he would have if compelled to defend in a
county where the only basis of venue is the residence of a codefendant.
As the revisers state in their note to the section referred to, such
procedure will prevent an unnecessary number of suits upon the
same instrument or cause of action. Very frequently the party
actually served may, as among the obligors, be a surety for others.
in which event judgment should go against all of the obligors, so
that if the person bearing the relation of surety be compelled to
pay the debt or obligation, he will have the benefit of a lien against
the person primarily bound.
Although the language of this section is broad and apparently
unqualified, venue based thereon may be subject to a limitation or
qualification requiring the proper joinder of the individual defendant upon *vhom service of process was had in the county

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss1/3

2

Lynch: Pleading and Practice under the Revised Code
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
where the cause of action arose. The case of Wolfe v. Jordan1 involved an action brought in Jackson County upon a cause of action
arising therein. One of the individual defendants resided in the
county and was served therein.
Process against the other defendant was directed to Kanawha County and served there. Under
the Revised Code venue prima facie could be laid in Jackson
County either on the ground of the residence of one of the defendants therein or on the ground that the cause of action arose
there. Under the Code of 1923 venue in Jackson County could be
justified only upon the ground of the residence of one of the
defendants therein. It appeared, however, that the defendant
residing in Jackson County was a guarantor and therefore only
secondarily liable, whereas the defendant residing in Kanawha
County was primarily liable. The court held that, under section 1,
chapter 123, Code 1923, basing venue upon the residence of one
of the defendants, there could be no venue in Jackson County
since the defendant residing there and served with proecss was
only secondarily liable and therefore improperly joined with the
defendant residing in Kanawha County who was primarily liable,
and that the latter's plea to the jurisdiction should have been
sustained. The court further held that venue in the county where
the cause of action arose could not be sustained under section 2
of that chapter because section 2 of the following chapter forbade the service of process on an individual defendant without
the county where the action was pending.
Although the revised section has changed the law in this latter
respect, our supreme court may construe the section as it construed section 1, chapter 123, Code 1923, in the case cited, and may
hold that the individual defendant served with process in the
county where the cause of action arose must be properly joined
as a defendant in order to sustain the venue of the action as
against a defendant residing in another county.
It is true section 34, article 4, chapter 56 of the Revised Code,
hereinafter discussed, provides that no action or suit shall abate
or be defeated by the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, plaintiff
or defendant, yet that is a section prescribing a rule of practice or
procedure rather than a jurisdictional statute, and where an essential jurisdiction fact fails, to-wit, service of process upon a
proper defendant in the county where the cause of action arose, the
entire venue fails. Under said section 34, the misjoined defendant
193 W. Va. 42, 116 S. E. 132 (1923).
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must be dismissed by the court, and with him goes the essential
jurisdictional element upon which venue in that county is based.
Notice of Motion for Judgment.
Section 6, article 2, chapter 56 of the Revised Code, relating
to notice of motion for judgment, retains the provisions of former
statutes limiting the proceeding to the recovery of money on contract. It was not extended to include causes of action ex delicto as
in Virginia. The revised section contains several important changes,
however. It lays jurisdiction or venue of the motion in any court
which would have jurisdiction of an action, and eliminates the
exception of former statutes prohibiting venue in the county in
which the cause of action arose. It requires the notice to be returned to the clerk's office "on or before the return day" thereof,
instead of "fifteen days before the motion is heard", as under
former statutes. If the term of court to which the notice is made
returnable continues for a period of twenty days after the service
of such notice, the revised section requires the motion for judgment
to be heard during such term, "unless good cause for a continuance
thereof be shown." It further provides that where the plaintiff has
filed an affidavit and the defendant has failed to file his plea and
counter affidavit, the court shall, on plaintiff's motion, and "without further proof," enter judgment for the plaintiff. The words
"without further proof" were inserted in lieu of the last sentence
in the first paragraph of Acts 1929, c. 39, which read: "And the
affidavit of the plaintiff hereinbefore mentioned shall be legal
evidence of plaintiff's claim." Before judgment is entered on any
negotiable instrument, however, the court must require the plaintiff to file the same in such proceeding.
Service of Process on Corporations.
In article 3 of chapter 56, relating to writs, process and erders
of publication, the most interesting and probably the most important changes are those relating to the service of process on
domestic and foreign corporations, found in § § 13 and 14 of said
article. In these two sections the revisers have grouped and consolidated the numerous statutory provisions relating to service of
process on corporations found in the Code of 1923, principally in
chapters 39, 41, 50, 52, 53 and 124.
Section 13 of article 3 relates to service of process on domestic
corporations and section 14 to service on foreign corporations.
The former, after providing for service of process on a municipal-
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ity, county court and board of education, greatly simplifies the
law relating to service on private corporations by providing for
,ervice (a) on the state auditor, who is appointed statutory attorney for all corporations, both foreign and domestic, by another
section of the Revised Code; or (b) on any person appointed by the
corporation to accept service of process in its behalf; or (c) on
its president or other chief officer, or its vice president, cashier,
assistant cashier, treasurer, assistant treasurer, secretary, or any
member of its board of directors; or (d) if no such officer or director be found, then on any agent of such corporation.
The revisers have eliminated all preferences among the various
named officers of a corporation which heretofore have existed in
matters of service of process. Even if the president or chief officer
can be found, the process may be served on the secretary or any
director. This will greatly simplify the form of return of process.
Certain preferences are retained, however, such as the preference
of an officer of a corporation to an agent.
This is a proper distinction because the officers named above will naturally feel a
greater responsibility than an agent in bringing process served
on them to the attention of the proper corporate officer.
On the
other hand, the statute recognizes the fact that process may safely
be served on an agent when a proper officer can not be found.
Section 14 of article 3, relating to service of process on foreign
corporations, is new. It provides that if the foreign corporation is
authorized to transact business in this state, process against it may
be served in the manner provided in § 13 for service on private
domestic corporations. If the corporation is not authorized to do
business in this state, process against it may be served on any officer, director or agent of such corporation acting or transacting
business for it in this state, without discrimination aniong them
or preference of one over the others.
The broad latitude thus
given in serving process where the corporation is not authorized
to transact business in this state was deemed advisable because
service can not be had on the auditor in such cases!
If no
statutory attorney in fact, officer, director or agent can be found
in this state upon whom service can be had as aforesaid, an order
of publication may be awarded as provided by sections 23 and 24
of that article.
Heretofore, when process against a foreign corporation doing
business in this state was served upon an agent of such corpora'Leiter v. Fire Engine Co., 86 W. Va. 599, 104 S. E. 56 (1920).
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tion, under the provisions of section 35, chapter 50, and section 6,
chapter 41, Code 1923, such service had to be made in the county
in which the agent resided, and it was necessary that the return
show this fact.' The revised section, however, omits such requirement, thus making the law in this respect uniform as to both
foreign and domestic corporations.
In order that the procedure in justices' courts may be the same
as in other courts as regards service of process on corporation,
sections 13 and 14 of said article 3 are repeated as sections 11 and
12, respectively, of article 3, chapter 50, except for slight modifications to conform to the territorial limitations on the jurisdiction
and authority of a justice, as provided in § 28, article 8 of the
Constitution. In addition, the revisers added a new section (§ 16
of said article 3, chapter 50), which expressly requires the auditor
to accept service of any process against any corporation for which
he is statutory attorney in fact, when such process is issued by any
justice in this state or in any proceeding pending in any justice's
court.
Transfer of Cases from Law to Equity and Vice Versa.
Section 11, article 4 of chapter 56, which is a new section, represents a departure from common law procedure made by the revisers. It was taken verbatim from the Virginia Code of 1919 and
provides for the transfer of a case from law to equity, or vice
versa, which had been instituted on the wrong side of the court.
Provision is made for the necessary changes in, or amendments of,
the pleadings to make them conform to the proper practice made
necessary by the transfer.'
Statements of Particidarsof Claim or Defense.
In order to assist in arriving at a more definite issue in advance
of trial, the revisers have made provision whereby the court may
require sworn statements of the particulars of the plaintiff's
claim and of the defendant's defense. They have omitted section
46, chapter 130, Code 1923, relating to the same general subject,
and have substituted in lieu thereof, with some slight amendments,
the more comprehensive provisions of sections 62, 63 and 66, chapter 125, Code 1923. The sections last mentioned originally related
only to statements of the particulars of the claim or defense in
3Ibid.

4For a similar federal statute see 28 U. S. C. § 397 (1926).
federal equity rule 28.
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actions on insurance policies, but the revisers have broadened
them to cover all actions and motions.'
Under these sections the
court may order the plaintiff, or defendant, to file a more particular statement of the nature of his claim, or defense, as the case
may be, or of the facts expected to be proved at the trial. Such
statement must be sworn to by the plaintiff, or defendant, as the
case may be, or by some other credible person. If no statement, or
an insufficient statement, is filed, the court may grant further
time for filing the same, or permit the statement filed to be amended, or may, at the trial, exclude the evidence offered by the party
in default as to any matter which he has so failed to state or has
insufficiently stated, and which is not described in the pleading
of such party so plainly as to give the adverse party notice of its
character.
Amendments to Pleadings and Process.
In section 24, article 4, chapter 56, the revisers have made several
important changes in the statute law relating to amendments. The
revised section provides, among other things, that the court, "if
in its opinion substantial justice will be promoted thereby, may,
at any time before final judgment or decree, and upon such terms
as it may deem just, permit any pleading to be amended, or
material supplemental matter to be set forth in amended or supplemental pleadings, introducing a necessary party, discontinuing
as to a party, eliminating from a multifarious bill all but one of
the equitable causes of action alleged, or changing the form but
not the cause of action, except that no proceeding by motion shall
be converted by amendment into a formal action at law, or vice
versa, and the court may allow any other amendment in matter of
form or substance in any process which is not void, pleading or
proceeding, which may enable the plaintiff to sustain the action,
suit, motion or proceeding for the cause for which it was intended
lo be brought, or enable the defendant to make full and complete
defense. "
The provision giving the plaintiff the right to eliminate from
a multifarious bill all but one of the equitable causes of action
alleged changes the law as expressed in numerous decisions of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of this state.
The changes in this section and in section 30 of the same article
eliminate an ambiguity that heretofore has existed in § 15, c. 125,
'See RL'v. CoD1 , e. 56, art, 4, § § 19, 2O and 23.
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Code 1923, and make it plain that process which is not void may be
amended at any time, not only with reference to variances from
the declaration, but also with reference to defects within the writ
itself. Some doubt heretofore has existed with reference to the
right to make a substantial amendment even in a writ that is not
void, for in Fisher v. Crowley,' our supreme court said: "Though
by the common law, some vrits were amendable, the power of
amendment only existed as to slight and formal defects. Even
in this respect, some writs were not amendable by the common law
courts. * * * Sections 14 and 15 of chapter 125 of the Code provide for the correction of misnomers and variances in the writ
and nothing more. Hence, it is probable that they are merely
declaratory of the common law." Section 30 adds a further provision which makes it plain that it is not necessary, as asserted in
Laidley's Administrator v. Bright's Administrator,"to file a plea
in abatement based upon such defect or variance as a condition
precedent to the .authority of the court to permit an amendment
of the writ.
Section 24 expressly prohibits the amendment of void process,
and, when read in connection with section 30, retains for a defendant any right which he has by the common law to move to
quash such void process. Section 30 further provides that if the
process be void, the suit or action shall be dismissed on motion
of the defendant. The revisers state that this provision may
result in changing the rule of decision in Daiiser v. Maflonce," in
which the court permitted a special appearance for the purpose of
moving to quash a process (attachment and order of publication),
but held that an additional motion to dismiss the case from the
docket, made after the court had sustained the motion to quash,
amounted to a general appearance.
Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties.
Section 34, article 4, chapter 56, makes substantial changes in
the law of this state relating to misjoinder and nonjoinder of
parties, some phases of which were discussed in an earlier portion
of this paper. The revised section provides, among other things,
that "no action or suit shall abate or be defeated by the misjoinder
or non joinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant". In the future,
when such defects are made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, it
157 W. Va. 312, 316, 318, 50 S. E. 422 (1005).
7 17 W. Va. 779, 793 (1881).
'77 W. Va. 26, 86 S. E. 895 (1915).
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will be the duty of the court, of its own accord or upon motion,
to order the misjoined parties to be dropped and non-joined or
omitted persons to be made parties by proper amendment and
process. This change, therefore, does away with both misjoinder
and nonjoinder of parties as a ground for abating or defeating an
action or suit. It dispenses with pleas in abatements for such defects, wherever such pleas have been proper heretofore, and
probably changes the rule of decision of our supreme court in
holding such defects to be grounds of demurrer when they are
apparent on the face of the pleading.
In discussing the correspondnig section of the Virginia Code
of 1919,' from which several provisions of our revised section are
taken, Judge Burks says:
"Under the above statute it is believed that the proper
remedy for a misjoinder is a motion to abate as to the parties
improperly joined, and that as to nonjoinder the proper
remedy is a motion to add the parties improperly omitted.
The misjoinder or nonjoinder may be made to appear 'by
affidavit or otherwise,' and this language would seem to indicate that it is desirable in every case to support the motion
by an affidavit setting out the facts.""
Sections 17 and 19, chapter 125, Code 1923, provided only for
joinder of an omitted party who is a resident of the state. The revised section, however, pliminates this restriction and permits the
joinder of a nonresident.
Section 18, chapter 125, Code 1923, required the determination of
a preliminary issue as to whether the Statute of Frauds or the
Statute of Limitations prevented the maintenance of the action
against the person whose nonjoinder was suggested.
If either or
both were found to apply, the issue on the plea in abatement was
determined against the defendant so pleading. The revised section
eliminates this restriction because the defenses mentioned may be
waived and not raised by the omitted parties when they are finally
joined. If they had been named among the original parties defendant, no preliminary issue of such nature would have been
necessary or proper until introduced by proper pleading, and the
same course should be followed where those omitted are joined as
parties by subsequent amendment.
-§ 6102.
"GBT'm~s

P.FATDING AND PRACTICE

(2nd ed. 1920) 63.
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Demnurrers.
Sections 36 and 65, article 4, chapter 56, make substantial
changes in the law governing demurrers.
They establish the demurrer as the pleading to be used in all instances to test the legal
sufficiency of other pleadings. Our decisions hold that exceptions
to an answer, motions to quash, motions to strike out, and motions
for the award of a peremptory writ of mandamus, are analogous to
and treated as demurrers. For that reason the revisers deemed it
advisable to authorize a demurrer to any pleading, directly rather
than indirectly, where the pleader wishes to test the legal sufficiency of such pleading. The revised sections, therefore, abolish
the practice of objecting to the filing of pleas and of excepting to
answers. The result will be to require a party to await the filing
of a pleading before testing its sufficiency.
No advantages in
time is lost by this course, for a party may demur immediately
after a pleading is filed, and his demurrer must at once be set
for argument.
Heretofore there has been some hesitancy in demurring to a
plea, if the plaintiff's demurrer were overruled, it was doubtful
whether he could reply without withdrawing his demurrer, unless
the defendant were held to a recognition of the implied withdrawal of the demurrer by offering no objections to the subsequent filing of replications by the plaintiff. This defect was revealed in the case of Camden Clay Co. v. Town of New Martinsville.'
The revisers, however, in section 39, article 4, chapter 56, have, by
amendment, given to the plaintiff the same right to demur and
reply that the statute heretofore has accorded to the defendant in
demurring and pleading.
All demurrers in civil cases are required to be in writing and
must state specifically the grounds of demurrer relied upon. No
grounds can be considered at the instance of the demurrant other
than those so stated, but the court of it own accord may consider
questions pertaining to the legal sufficiency of a pleading, even
when not assigned as grounds of demurrer. The demurrant, however, may, by leave of the court, amend his demurrer by stating
additional grounds, or otherwise, at any time before the trial
at law or final hearing in equity.
Section 44, article 4, chapter 56, abolishes similiters and joinders
in demurrer.
67 IV. Ya. 525, 68 S. E. 118 (1910).
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Time for Filing Answer in. Equity.
Sections 56 and 57, article 4, chapter 56, permit a defendant
to file his answer at any time before final decree, unless he has
filed a plea or has demurred to the plaintiff's bill. If he has filed
a plea or has demurred, and the court overrules the same, the defendant is required to file his answer within fifteen days after the
overruling of such plea or demurrer, unless, for good cause shown,
the time is enlarged by the court or the judge in vacation
The
answer must be filed in court if in session, and, if not in session,
provision is made for filing the answer in the clerk's office where
it is given the same status and effect as if filed in term.
If no
answer is filed within such period, the plaintiff becomes entitled
forthwith to a decree against the defendant for the relief prayed
for in the bill, or the plaintiff, if he prefers, may have an attachment against the defendant or an order for him to be brought in
to answer interrogatories. In view of the foregoing changes, the
provision for a rule requiring the defendant to answer, formerly in
the statute, is omitted.
Appearance of Corporation by Attorney.
Section 63, article 4, chapter 56, is new. Among other things, it
provides than any corporation may appear, plead or answer by
attorney or any legal proceeding as if it were a natnral person.
The effect of this change is to abolish the rule that an answer in
equity filed by a corporation must be signed by the president and
have the corporate seal attached. The revised section permits the
answer to be signed by the attorney on behalf of the corporation
and dispenses with the corporate seal.
It also makes plain the
right of a corporation to appear by attorney in any legal proceeding.
Special Plea of Set-Off.
Section 5, article 5, chapter 56, materially enlarges the matters
which a defendant in an action on a contract may set-off against
the plaintiff's claim It permits the defendant in any such action
to file a plea alleging (a) any such failure in the consideration of
the contract, or (b) fraud in its procurement, or (c) any such
breach of any warranty to him of the title to real property, or
of the title or the soundness of personal property, involved in the
contract, or (d) any other matter, as would entitle him (the defendant) either to recover damages at law from the plaintiff, or the
person under whom the plaintiff claims, or to relief in equity,

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1930], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
in whole or in part., against the obligation of the contract.
The
words "or any other matter" constitute the amendment made by
the revisers, and they state in their note at the end of the section
that "the revised section as a whole contemplates the settlement
of all differences that are connected with the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim."
The inquiry naturally arises, are the words "or any other matter" broader than therxevisers' note indicates and will they permit
a defendant to set off against the original contract claim a tort
claim or a claim for damages arising out of an entirely unrelated
transaction? This inquiry assumes special importance because of
the right of a defendant to recover from the plaintiff any excess
of his claim over the plaintiff's claim against him.
The words added by the revisers were taken from section 6145
of the Virginia Code of 1919, which in other respects is similar
to our statute, and any construction or interpretation placed upon
them by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia prior to their
adoption by the Legislature of West Virginia will have persuasive,
possibly controlling, force in determining their scope and meaning in this state.
In the case of American Manganese Company v. Virginia
Manganese Company' the Virginia court held that the meaning of
the words "or any other matter" used in the section is restricted
by the numerous defenses which precede them, and hence no set-off
can be pleaded by the defendant which does not grow out of the
contract involved in the suit. Subsequent decisions of that court
adhere to that construction.
It follows, therefore, that the statute will doubtless carry the
same construction in this state, thus limiting it to the settlement
of differences that are connected with the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim. Tort claims and claims arising out of unrelated
transactions would therefore be excluded.
Failure of Plaintiff to "Sign" Judgment After
Plea to Part of Plaintiff's Claim.
Section 9, article 6, chapter 56, is new. Its object is to prevent
a case from being discontinued under the technical rule of the common law to the effect that if a plea professes to answer only part of
the declaration, and is in truth but an answer to part, the plaintiff
is entitled to "sign" or take judgment for the part not answered
91 Va. 272, 21 S. E. 466 (1895).
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by the plea, and to demur or reply as to the part that is answered.
If, however, he demures or replies to the plea without signing judgment for the part not answered, the whole action is discontinued
because of the hiatus in the proceedings. Our court, apparently regards the rule as still existing.' In order to change this common
law rule, the revised section provides that, where a defendant has
pleaded to a part of the plaintiff's claim and has left the residue
unanswered, the case shall not be discontinued merely because the
plaintiff has failed to "sign" judgment as to the unanswered
residue, but the plaintiff may, before or after trial of the issue
as to the part answered, take judgment by n dicit as to such unanswered residue.
Trial Juries.
Section 11, article 6, chapter 56, permits the parties in any
case except a case of felony, by consent entered of record, to have
their trial before a jury composed of any number less than twelve.
This is a departure from section 29, chapter 116, Code 1923, which
provided only for a jury of seven when the customary jury of
twelve was not desired. The revisers state in their note to this
section that no reason is perceived why the parties may not be
permitted to agree to any number of jurors less than twelve,
especially where one or more of the original jury of twelve have
become incapacitated and it is desired to conclude the trial with
the remaining jurors.
This section also permits the plaintiff alone to dispense with a
jury where the defendant has failed to appear.
Instructions.
Section 19, article 6, chapter 56, requires the action of the court
upon every instruction, given or refused, to be noted on the margin
thereof by the judge over his "signature", instead of over his
"initials" as formerly required.
Section 20 of the same article makes every instruction in writing asked by any party, together with the notations thereon showing the action of the court with reference thereto, a part of the
record of the case without the formality of a bill of exception,
including instructions refused, as well as those given, by the court.
The statute formerly made part of the record only instructions
which had been read to the jury.
"Risher v. Wheeling Roofing and Cornice Co., 57 W. Va. 149, 153, 49 S. E.
1016 (1905).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1930

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1930], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Effect of Faulty Count Upon Verdict.
Section 26, article 6, chapter 56, makes some important changes
in the la~v relating to this subject. The former statute1' provided
that where there were several counts in a declaration, one of
which was faulty, the defendant might ask the court to instruct
the jury to disregard it; but if entire damages were given, the
verdict would be good.' The revised section, however, permits tne
defendant to "demur" to the faulty count or counts as well as to
move the court to instruct the jury to disregard them. It further
provides that if the defendant does neither and entire damages are
found, the verdict will stand, if any count be good, unless the
court can plainly see that the verdict could not have been found on
the good count. If the defendant demurs to, or moves the court
to instruct the jury to disregard, the faulty count, and his demurrer or motion is overruled, and entire damages be found,
and it cannot be seen on which count the verdict was founded,
then, if the jury has been discharged, the verdict shall be set aside
unless it is manifest the verdict could not have been found on the
bad count. But if the jury has not been discharged the court shall
send it back with instructions to designate on which count of the
declaration its verdict is found.
Recovery Against One or More Contract Defendants.
Section 32, article 6, chapter 56, makes some material changes
in the law of this state relating to the right of the plaintiff to recover against one or more of several defendants in an action founded on contract. The statute heretofore relating to this subject was
section 19, chapter 131, Code 1923, which reads as follows:
"In an action founded on contract, against two or more defendants, although the plaintiff may be barred as to one or
more of them, yet he may have judgment against any other or
others of the defendants against whom he would have been
entitled to recover, if he had sued them only, on the contract
alleged in the declaration."
Under the strict rule of common law pleading, where a joint
action on contract was brought against several defendants, a judgment could be rendered only for, or against, all, unless one of the
defendants was discharged by matter personal to himself, such for
instance as infancy or a discharge in bankruptcy.
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 131, § 13.
I See Freeman v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 98 W. Va. 311, 128
S. E. 129 (1924):
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The foregoing statute was intended to relax the common law
rule just referred to, but in the case of Scott v. Newell," our
supreme court seemingly held that the statute had accomplished
nothing. That case was an action of assumpsit against six persons
as "Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church of Chester, West
Virginia." It appears that some of the defendants were not
trustees when the contract with the plaintiff was entered into, thus
presenting to the court the question of the effect of the statute
where there is a misjoinder of parties. In affirming a judgment
for the defendants, our court declined to adopt the more liberal
construction given to a similar statute by the Virginia court, and
held that the statute did not change the common law rule in the
case of a joint action against several defendants on an alleged joint
promise, when the plea is joint, because proof that all did not
make the promise would establish a fatal variance not curable by
amendment. The cour said: "Plaintiff cannot allege a joint promise
and recover on proof of a promise as to some of the defendants
only.))
The Supreme Court of Virginia, construing a similar statute in
Bvs7h v. Campbell,' reached a conclusion directly opposed
to that of our court. The court held that the purpose
of the statute was not merely to affirm the common law
which permitted judgment against part of the defendants when the
other had set up a "personal" defense, but was intended to apply
"whenever the defense of one of several defendants is of such a
character that the plaintiff might recover against the other if the
suit was against that other only". As thus construed, the statute
permits the plaintiff to recover judgment against those defendants
liable in the pending action, instead of compelling him to sue the
same defendants in a new action.'
The revised section attempts to meet this situation by providing
ihat, in any action or motion founded on contract, if one or more
of the defendants is found not liable on the contract, this "shall
not prevent the plaintiff from having, as if the motion or action
were an action founded on tort, verdict and judgement, or judgment alone, as the case may be, against any other defendant or defendants who are liable; nor shall the fact that a verdict is set
aside as to one or more of the defendants in such action or motion
1069 W. Va. 118, 70 S. E. 1092 (1911).

"26 Gratt. 403, 425 et seq. (1875).
See Jones and Carlin, Non-Joinder and Misjoinder of Parties in Com.
non Law Actions, (1922) 29 W. VA. L. Q. 266, 268-275.
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as contrary to the
evidence prevent the plaintiff from having
judgment on such verdict as to any other defendant or defendants
found liable thereby."
This section supplements section 34, article 4, chapter 56, heretofore discussed, providing that no action shall abate or be defeated because of a misjoinder of parties.
The purpose of the
section is to permit recovery on the contract as proved and not on
the contract is pleaded. It does not in any sense do away with
the distinction between joint contracts and joint and several contracts, nor does it substitute joint and several liability, upon the
parties to a contract who contract jointly, in lieu of the joint
obligation created by the contract and to which the parties agree.
The revised section provides merely that if any one or more of the
defendants are found liable on the contract, the plaintiff may have
3udgment against the others who are found to be liable. It does
not permit the plaintiff to take judgment against part of those so
found liable and dismiss as to .the others.
This paper already has attained such undue length as to make
imperative its immediate termination. It has been impossible to
discuss all of the interesting and important changes made by the
revisers in chapter 56 of the Revised Code, or those in other chapters, which likewise are of great interest to the legal profession and
the judiciary. It is believed, however, that these changes, when fully
understood, will be recognized as steps tending toward greater
simplicity of pleading, practice and procedure.
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